IGAD

CEWARN

CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM

IGAD CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM [CEWARN]

REGIONAL CONFLICT PROFILE AND SCENARIO BUILDING

2021

IGAD CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM [CEWARN]

REGIONAL CONFLICT PROFILE AND SCENARIO BUILDING

2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AI	Anticipated Impact
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CPRM	County Peace Response Members
DINA	Disaster Information Nationwide Assessment
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-Based Organizations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPPSHAR	IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
MS	Member State
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPRs	National Police Reserves
NRA	New Red Army
NRIs	National Research Institutes
RESGAS	IGAD Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Somalia Mission
RI	Real Impact
RRF	Rapid Response Fund
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNATT	United Nations Arms Trade Treaty
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WHO	World Health Organization
VEGs	Violent Extremist Groups

1. BACKGROUND

IGAD was established in 1986 to address issues of drought and disaster across the region. Ten years later, the Authority expanded to include Peace, and Security Programs. IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002 by the member states initially through the Khartoum Declaration of 2000 and the signing of the CEWARN Protocol which was adopted in 2003 to support member states efforts to manage cross-border pastoralist conflicts. This provided the platform for CEWARN to broaden its early warning operations to other thematic areas grouped under five analytic domains: economy, governance, social affairs, security, and environmental issues. CEWARN is specifically mandated to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak, and escalation in the IGAD region.

Today, IGAD receives much of its support from the European Union (EU) through the IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region (IPPSHAR) programme. The Austrian Development Agency's (ADA) serves as an operational unit.

CEWARN operates at regional, national, and local levels. The peace and security division of IGAD monitors developments on the regional level. CEWARN also works collaboratively with the African Union Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS), the UN, and other RECs to collect, analyze, and share early warning information and capacity building. On the national level, CEWARN works through the national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERU) that are hosted in designated government ministries. The CEWERU committees work together with other line ministries and institutions.

The committee's work is supported and informed by the Information Collection Networks (ICNs), which gather early warning data, and the National Research Institutions (NRIs), which provide the analysis of received data. CEWARN undertakes various approaches to conflict analysis, from the identification of patterns and trends based on its data base to more qualitative methods including the profiling of conflicts and conflict scenario building. The combination of these methods enables the mechanism to understand the evolving dynamics of conflicts in the IGAD region.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a synthesized regional report based on country-specific thematic research, country conflict profiles, scenario-building reports, daily briefs, weekly update reports, national and regional situation room reports, sectoral NRI country reports, and field data received from CEWARN's integrated reporter system. For CEWARN, an issue is considered to be regional if it manifests in (or has the potential to manifest) at least three of the seven-member states. Issues that do not fall in this category, but are considered early warning in nature among the different member states are captured in the national reports. This report was further honed by a regional validation exercise that brought together experts from the member states and IGAD peace and security programs.

This report draws from various data collection processes to identify and analyze types of conflicts likely to arise. All of the discussions have been compiled into a brief analysis for each conflict. Whether they are persistent, emerging, escalating, dissipating, or a combination of two or more is explored in the contexts provided.

Key issues of conflict early warning concerns: From the nearly sixty conflict early warning issues currently of significant concerns in the IGAD region, an expert workshop validated a 60-page report that prioritized nine key conflict issues with high potentials of becoming violent.

Table one: Key issues of conflict early warning concern in the IGAD region today

Issues	Ranking
Youth unemployment	1
Pandemics	2
Mismanaged electoral processes	3
Extreme climatic conditions	4
Land and natural resource-based disputes	5
Polarized ethnicity and tribalism	6
Violent extremism	7
Interstate conflicts	8
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)	9

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

3. KEY QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PURPOSES

Key questions: The report seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are critical points of concern, and why is conflict early warning important now?
- If nothing is done, what is likely to happen?
- Is the region heading towards a worst-case scenario?
- What are the plausible interventions, and what will be the impacts in both actual and anticipated terms?
- Are there policy recommendations the region can benefit from?

Objectives: There are three key objectives for early warning and early response:

- Data collection
- Data analysis
- Communication

The designation of these objectives is, according to the protocol establishing CEWARN/IGAD, for:

- Informing the decision-makers of IGAD policy organs and the national governments of Member States about conflicts in the region.

- To enable IGAD to anticipate conflicts and respond proactively.

- To aid in decision and policymaking.

3.1   WHY CONFLICT PROFILING

- By engaging critical informants at sub-national and national levels, conflict profiling aims to identify and inform on issues that are perceived to be critical in nature that may disrupt the political and social-economic stability of a Member State and the region. It enhances understanding of structural and situational factors (identify proximate, triggering cases).

- In addition to actor profiling, the trends analysis improves understanding of a conflict in regard to its persistent, emerging, escalating, or dissipating nature.

- Conflict profiling is an open-ended process because of the dynamism of contexts. Sometimes responses can also generate conflict, which is why responses also need to be analyzed.

- Conflict profiling plays a vital role in improving decision and policymakers' understanding of conflict trajectories at given intervals.

3.2   WHY DO SCENARIO-BUILDING

Scenario building is an analytical means of predicting the future that is employed to project the outcomes of a given situation. The indicators of conflict are critical elements of developing scenarios based on a given context. The projections are categorized into the best case, worst-case, and medium or status quo case scenario.

The best-case scenario is the optimal positive outcome of the current situation. The middle case scenario refers to maintenance of the status quo. The worst-case scenario is the least desirable negative outcome. Recommendations are provided to help translate the worst-case scenario into the best case and prevent the situation from escalating.

The report has identified nine key issues of regional nature that are a high-risk factor in perpetuating or causing conflict if not addressed. These include; high youth unemployment, pandemics, mismanagement of electoral processes, extreme climatic conditions, land and natural resource-based conflicts, polarized ethnicity and tribalism, violent extremism, and inter-state conflicts.

4. CATEGORIZED REGIONAL ISSUES, CONTEXT, CAUSES, ACTORS, IMPACT, TRENDS, SCENARIOS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section, nine conflict early warning issues are analyzed and ranked; their trends, causes, actors, impact (real and anticipated) are explored. For each of the issues, scenarios (best and worst case) are scrutinized from a regional lens. The last part of the section highlights the conclusions and recommendations.

4.1 YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Youth unemployment is a common factor in the region. Between 2010 and 2019, youth unemployment across IGAD member states stood at 14.5 percent. Like elsewhere in the world, economic hardship and poor income are drivers of youth migration out of the region searching for better livelihood. For youth migrants from the IGAD region, the Middle East and Southern Africa regions are the primary destinations. From the perspective of early warning, high youth unemployment is a source and potential trigger for conflict.

The many youths impoverished with meager income and poor future prospects are vulnerable to manipulation by extreme ideological groups, organized criminals, and ethnic militias. While migration is not an unusual phenomenon, increasing youth migration in the IGAD region has contributed to family destabilization, resulting in young people disengaging from family formations and social bonds.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

The IGAD region's high population growth is directly linked to youth unemployment. Economic drivers like tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) have not delivered the jobs needed to keep up with demographic growth, and as a result youth unemployment is now linked to issues like crime, illegal migration, ethnic profiling, and other concerns. The majority of youth live in rural settings where the informal sector and casual agricultural employment sectors dominate. However, these sectors are associated with low productivity. The long-term trend of rural to urban migration does not change the fact that urban youth face the same problems. Even if there were an increase in FDI, the continued mismatch of skills and job requirements would still leave the region with the issue of un-employable youth on the grounds of lack of needed skills.

Unemployed youth, who are directly affected by governments' role as policymaker and manager of fiscal decisions, end up being primary actors in many conflict settings. The inability of most parents to provide the necessary support to their children worsens the situation. All of this helps explain why the youth tend to be the most affected by conflict both as victims and perpetrators. The Bishoftu workshop examined the youth variable and its implications by considering best case, status quo and worst case scenarios of future trends.

Table two: Showing real and anticipated impacts of youth unemployment

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Migration • Brain drain • Avenues for human trafficking • Increased dependency rate • Riots • Increased crime rates • Extreme poverty	• Heightened vulnerability often exploited by extremist groups to induce civil disobedience • Perpetuation of poverty (cycle), especially among the offspring of the unemployed youths • Shortage of marriage partners linked to increased youth migration • Fear of civil disobedience and crime associated with unemployment informs diversion of private and public resources away from productivity to security

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table three: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for youth unemployment

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Increased hands-on/ vocational training • Increased industrialization • The unemployment rate drops to below 5%. • Expansion of middle class	• The informal sector is absorbing the numbers, and underemployment is growing. • The minimum wage is dismissed	• Increase in unemployment rate • Lawlessness and high crime rates in Urban settings • Uncontrolled and unabated increase (both voluntarily or forced) youth recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.2   PANDEMICS

The COVID-19 pandemic has slowed down economic, security, social, and governance activities across the IGAD region. COVID-19 containment measures have also perceptibly exacerbated poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and public debt. Furthermore, the pandemic has influenced life-changing behavior in all sectors following strict lockdowns, and related Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) put in place by many states to control its spread. Economic growth in the IGAD region has dropped from 4.06 percent in 2019 to 1.04 percent in 2020. While the economic decline has disproportionately affected low-income citizens and the vulnerable, efforts by governments to bridge revenue deficits and boost government spending have yielded limited results.

The contraction in economic growth resulted from reduced demand for exports, remittance flows, tourism receipts, and a contraction in aggregate domestic demand. Almost all these drops were induced by coronavirus containment measures. Governments' support for the health sector and livelihood have increased public debt. External public debt has also exacerbated other government sectoral vulnerabilities across the region. Sluggish tax revenue and export growth, for example, have affected external interest payment obligations.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

The corona virus and enforcement of the related social protocols adopted to contain it came with trauma and misinformation. Prolonged application of containment measures has also affected livelihoods. In light of these stresses, ensuring strict adherence to containment measures often involved excessive use of force by law enforcement officers on citizens. Key actors to consider are citizens, government, and security agencies, while the secondary actors are viewed as World Health Organization (WHO), CSOs, pharmaceutical companies, and anti-vaccine groups.

Table four: Showing real and anticipated impacts of pandemics (COVID-19)

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Death from COVID-19 • Unemployment • Riots • Likelihood of mortality from other ailments • Prioritization of response over other sectors • Teenage pregnancy and school dropouts	• The increased adoption of external debt financing • Sluggish export growth and depreciating local currencies amid external public debt interest payment obligations • Depletion of public reserves • Loss of trust in governments • Poorly trained graduands • Even more deaths in the region

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table five: Best, status quo, and worst case scenarios on the COVID-19 pandemic

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Increased awareness • Availability of COVID-19 vaccine • Soft loans to worst-hit businesses	• The region is still finding its bearing in dealing with the virus • COVID-19 Vaccination schemes have been rolled out	• Spike in number of deaths and infections • Increased cases of losses of income • Severe region-wide socio-economic disruptions

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia))

4.3 MISMANAGED ELECTORAL PROCESSES

In the past two years, national elections have taken place in five IGAD member states. Most of the electoral processes have been tainted by allegations of mismanaged processes and election malpractices; inadequate civic education, vote rigging, intimidation, arrests and in some cases torture. These developments negatively impact the promotion of good governance in the region. Heavy use of force by the security apparatus to quell protests is common during, and after elections in the region while the judicial processes that preside over contested election results are accused of lacking neutrality. Furthermore, election management bodies are typically accused of siding with incumbents and using the state machinery to manipulate results.

The media has played a crucial role in exposing malpractices before, during, and after elections despite increased restrictions and clampdown. The media has also been praised for serving as a watchdog of civic processes. At the same time, the media is criticized for the spread of hate speech and propaganda. It should also be noted that the nature of the media is changing rapidly in the IGAD region, if not globally. While some media are expanding their coverage and flourishing in some IGAD countries, others are shrinking with acute shortages of funding and heavy political pressure. This trend in the media landscape is likely to have implications for shaping peace, security, and conflict prevention in the region.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

Conflicts linked to the mismanagement of elections can be triggered by the excessive use of force by security agencies and how the media is treated during these processes among other factors. At the end of the polls, the judiciary's effectiveness will also influence the likelihood of conflicts particularly in situations where politics is characterized by intolerance. Dissatisfaction with constitutional frameworks addressing election-related disputes, like the courts and special tribunals, could spark conflicts. Key actors here are governments, electoral management bodies, and opposition part members. Citizens, CSOs, the media, the election observers, and the human rights commission are mostly secondary actors.

Table six: Showing real and anticipated impacts of the mismanaged election process

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Violence before, during, and after elections • Rejection of the election outcome • Loss of lives and property • Looting and destruction of property • Increase in propaganda	• Legitimacy of the government is questioned • Political instability • Decline in economic growth • Migration • Loss of revenue and investment

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table seven: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for mismanaged electoral processes

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Free and fair election conducted • Improved media freedoms and responsibility • Peaceful transition of power • Visibly impartial independent police, media, and judiciary	• Disgruntled citizenry • The state uses the security apparatus to legitimize itself	• Election violence leading to state fragility • Coup

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.4 EXTREME CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

Torrential rains have caused floods and accelerated soil erosion in many parts of the IGAD region. There are also long spells of drought, which, when combined with torrential rains, have affected over 70 percent of the region's population who derive their livelihood from agriculture and pastoralism. Researchers affirm that the persistent and escalating extreme weather conditions are among the root causes of migration both within and across borders.

In Djibouti, drought has caused severe water shortages and a food crisis affecting 340,000 people and causing a loss of 50 to 70 percent of the livestock. In Sudan, an estimated 80 percent of the country's rural population relies on agriculture-based production for their food and income. In Somalia, floods displaced nearly 215,000 people and floods have affected 1,034,000 people since July-2020 in South Sudan. In Somalia, the government-led Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) found that there had been over US$3 billion, or 50 % of annual GDP, in damages or losses due to drought. Uganda, on the other hand, has battled a combination of mudslides, floods, and drought. In Kenya's northern and northeastern counties, dwindling pasture and water due to prolonged droughts and depletion of grazing lands trigger violent conflicts.

The region also faced a devastating desert locust invasion in 2020 and was affected by a second wave in 2021. Severe impacts of this phenomenon including food shortages forced member states like Somalia to declare national emergencies. Inter-communal conflicts in Kenya among the Marehan and the Murulle as well as the Garre and the Murule are linked to desert locust invasion that exacerbated scarcity of resources by destroying pastures. When combined with repeated cycles of flooding and drought over many years, swarms of desert locusts are threatening food security, a situation that illustrates the convoluted nature of conflict drivers.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

The region's growing population is contributing to environmental degradation that overtime contributes to severe climatic conditions through the expansion of human settlements, overgrazing, deforestation, increased use of carbon-emitting machinery, and pollution. While this should call for more environmental protection laws, most of the region's implementation of existing policies is ineffective.

The key actors in extreme climate-induced conflicts are pastoralists, farmers, and cross-border communities seeking better climatic conditions, pasture, and water. The private sector, NGOs and civil society, media, security agencies, local administration, clan leaders, environmental activists and, political leaders tend to play a secondary role in such conflicts.

Table eight: Showing real and anticipated impacts of extreme climatic conditions

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Displacement • Drought and desertification • Migration • Food insecurity • Loss of livelihood and property • Poverty • Diseases • Death • Famine • Scarcity of essential commodities leading to inflation.	• Increased frequency and intensity of conflicts • Abandonment of ancestral land • Urbanization (creation of IDP's) • Pollution • Street children • Humanitarian crisis • Increased dependency on foreign aid • Increased poverty and unemployment • Overexploitation of natural resources • Loss of biodiversity

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table nine: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for extreme climatic conditions

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Guidelines regulating settlements within flood zones and water catchment areas are enforced • Policies and mechanisms for the efficient distribution of resources within the affected regions designed. • Environmental risk insurance schemes to target drought-prone regions will be designed. • Regional policies on land tenure, soil conservation measures, and water management are developed and harmonized. • Spraying ahead of time to avoid desert locust invasions • Stimulus packages for farmers who lost crops • Utilize the expertise of the regional desert control office to forecast and mitigate the invasion	• Limited funding for state agencies explains why the regulations are not enforced, and communities lack awareness of land use requirements. • The non-existence of a harmonized system of land tenure and water management • Farmers anticipate the return of the locusts	• Humanitarian crisis as a result of a failure of hosts and affected communities to accept government resettlement policies • Current climate change conditions and human-driven (anthropogenic) degradation, erosion, and floods escalate within the region. • The influx of large numbers of "environmental migrants" will increase conflict over scarce resources and conflict. • Frequent desert locust invasions cause destruction and famine

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.5   LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCE-BASED CONFLICTS

Contestations over land and natural resources as well as the scramble for property rights across the region presents a high potential for violent confrontations. Furthermore, border conflict, cattle rustling, widespread internal (ethnic-based) conflicts, disputes between central and local or state or regional governments are among other critical causes of human security concern in the region.

A number of inter-state conflicts have already emerged on these grounds. For example, Uganda and Kenya have had a persistent conflict over the Migingo Island while Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have a persistent conflict over fishing and oil drilling rights in the Albertine region. Ethiopia has a border conflict with Sudan and Somalia has a border conflict with Kenya over maritime borders, access to fishing grounds, and other natural resource rights.

Most internal conflicts stem from land use, ownership, and administration. Land conflicts vary from country to country, and some of them are manageable through dialogues woven around the laws of each member state and bi-lateral frameworks. One thing remains the same, though: land is a critical source of power, wealth and, identity for the state, communities, and individuals. When governments take over land ownership for developmental projects, frictions arise because communities resent the alienation of land under communal or individual tenure.

Land is intimately linked to gender issues. For example, women make up a large section of the landless despite relying widely on it to sustain families. Customary norms in a number of IGAD member states also restrict women from owning land. In addition, squatter-related issues highlight the battle between legal owners and those living in the area without proper documentation, who are vulnerable to unprocedural evictions. The legal owners of said land are often people with proximity to power and wealth. The problems tend to be politicized, then militarized when it comes to the eviction process.

The absence of clear property rights, together with erratic climate and social norms combine to perpetuate cattle rustling in the region. The absence of clearly defined sharing rights regarding proceeds from natural resources is a primary source of conflicts. Overlapping property rights are inherently inefficient for resource utilization, especially in conditions of common property tenure. Furthermore, tenure insecurity encourages suboptimal investment, which undermines economic growth and hinders job creation. These factors have aggravated poverty and income inequality. Also, the privatization of land in the region is contributing to new conflicts pitting external investors and their state partners against local communities. Though the process is legal and the state is working within its rights, allocating large tracts of land to foreign investors is a new source of discontent in the rangelands.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

Many causes that are linked to natural resource-based and land conflicts in the IGAD region can be listed. The issues discussed in the above paragraphs, for example, underscore the problems created by ineffective implementation of policies, the exclusion of local owners from natural resource royalties, dissatisfaction with the resettlement process in mineral-rich areas, development as gentrification, and land evictions. The primary actors in the conflict are citizens, government, farmers, and pastoralists. Developments behind the scenes however, highlight the influence of indirect actors like the private sector and foreign-owned multi-national companies, security personnel, political power brokers, environmental activists, and ethnic leaders who profit from inciting conflict.

Table ten: Showing real and anticipated impacts of land and natural resource-based conflicts

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Displacement • Boundary and land conflicts • Migration • Environmental degradation • Loss of life and property • Increase of crime rate • Lawlessness and chaos	• Displaced development • Institutional biases • Strained relationship between countries

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table eleven: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for land and natural resource-based conflicts

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Regular review and improvement of regional policies, monitoring mechanisms, and national strategies • Citizens benefitting from natural resources in their localities, e.g., jobs • Equity and inclusivity in resource sharing and use of power • Improved rangeland management policies and grazing arrangements	• Heavy presence of military at mineral-rich sites • Land wrangles • Displaced people	• Influx of people into the mining areas resulting in more tensions between the locals and the new settlers • Population growth and pressure • Increased criminality • Civil wars • Intensified humanitarian crises • Greater polarization of mineral issues • Inter-state conflicts over contested areas

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.6   POLARIZED ETHNICITY AND TRIBALISM

Ethnic identity has been institutionalized through governance systems, particularly in countries with federal constitutions. The struggle for political power and wealth in the context of identity politics often results in competition, and ethnic rivalry that turns violent. Arguments between individuals and small groups tribes can easily result in conflicts that usually unfold along clan, tribal and ethnic lines.

Tribal and ethnic issues traditionally invoke borders that function to enforce social boundaries. This has changed in the current regional context. Some communities find themselves excluded or discriminated against, or even barred from engaging in political activities. At the same time, soft borders enable spill over to neighboring nations, making national borders porous and subject to contestation. The problems generated by the Horn of Africa's region's hard borders on the other hand underscore the need for a new social contract based on shared prosperity for all, inclusivity, and promotion of the participation in decision making. But until this comes about, there it remains essential to track the ethnic dynamics responsible for polarization in many areas.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

Polarized ethnicity and ethnic affiliations are the norm in the IGAD region today. Transitioning from an ethnic-based herd mentality to citizen-based thinking is still a distant prospect. It is common practice fort citizens to vote based on tribal and ethnic affiliations instead of focusing, debating, and voting on issues. Ethnicity is clearly implicated in many conflicts that are otherwise rooted in issues of land use and ownership, and struggles for long-term control of resources. Ethnic groups often argue that land development is an attempt to take over their property.

Also, at border points, where human interactions based on soft borders take precedence over politically drawn hard borders, there are fewer demarcations that allow communities in different states that share a border to crisscross with ease. This works well until the issue of resource ownership starts, which is only made worse by institutionalized hard borders, and legalized ethnicity. The key actors in the conflict arising are politicians and their networks, reinforced by different kinds of community opinion influencers. The secondary actors are CSO's, FBO's, and human rights groups in contrast.

Table twelve: Showing real and anticipated impacts of polarized ethnicity and tribalism

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Lack of patriotic and loyal citizens • Weak and fragile states • Nation-building difficulties	• Ungovernable societies as robust social systems are dismantled.

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table thirteen: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for polarized ethnicity and tribalism

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Better promotion of ethnic cohesion. • Promote citizen-based institutions • Encourage inter-marriages • Ban ethnic-based politics • Community developmental programs • Community awareness creation and nation-building • Promotion of shared resources and services • Facilitation of flexible and soft boundaries	• Tension continues in the affected areas • Institutionalized ethnicity • Soft boundaries • Militarized societies (shrinking civil spaces everyone is combative)	• Polarization of ethnicity • Intensified inter-ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing or genocide. • Hate speech • Espionage • Stereotyping • Killings • Hard Boundaries that disrupt social and economic interactions • Continued institutionalization of ethnicity • Marginalization

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.7   VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Violent extremism and extremist groups (VEGs) promote terrorism, which has become a consistent feature of the security landscape in the region. Terrorists employ systematic violence to achieve their goals. Actions threatening human lives and property, are part of the tactics that now include cyber-security threats that exert spillover across IGAD's national borders. Contemporary violent extremism is by definition a networked phenomenon where actors based in more than one country often plan, coordinate, and execute their illegal activities. Over time these groups become increasing involved in transnational organized crimes (TOC), which in this region includes human trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling drugs, poaching, and trading in small arms and light weapons. Violent extremism goes hand in hand with radicalization, and is linked to the rise in crime rates..

Somalia is considered the epicenter of regional terrorism, while Kenya, Sudan and Uganda are seen to be most at risk because of the 'spillover effect. Uganda and other countries are also at risk. While recruitment and radicalization is occurring across the region. Violent extremism can be a precursor to larger forms of violent conflict.

In addition to internationally organized terrorist groups, conflict early warning observers have noted the rise of organized criminal gangs, sometimes termed, 'gangs for hire'. These groups rely on the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) to engage in criminal activities, mainly at a local level. In contrast to VEGs and their ideological drivers, gang structures are typically loose and they operate when there are profits to make. This adds another layer of lawlessness among communities in different parts of the region that are coping with internecine communal violence driven by vagaries of weather, state neglect, and the other drivers of conflict identified in this report.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

Violent extremism thrives in conditions characterized by easy availability of illegal firearms, widespread unemployment, ineffective government structures, and corruption. Violent extremists used ideological incentives to take advantage of those driven by social and historical injustices, poverty, and greed for power and resources. It takes root in where unemployment is rampant, the search for better opportunities attracting those vulnerable to recruitment into the hands of violent extremist groups. The primary actors are well-known terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS or Daesh, but there other radicalized sects, and organized criminal groups operating under the radar. The secondary actors like international criminals who traffic arms, humans, and drugs who exploit other sympathizers or ideological prone individuals to participate in their activities.

Table fourteen: Showing real and anticipated impacts of violent extremism

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Loss of lives and property • Displacement of populations • Political instability • Deprivation of social services • Restriction of movement • Anarchy • Increased SGBV • Increase in pirates	• Breakdown of development/ Investment • Breakdown of law and order • Restriction on freedoms

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table fifteen: Showing scenario (best, status quo, and worst cases) of violent extremism

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Successful disarmament of armed groups • Amnesty programs for reformed terrorists • Reduced radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups • Re-integration of radicalized groups and sympathizers • Improved socio-economic development and youth employment • Increased awareness of the effect of fundamentalism.	• Alhough Al-Shabaab has been losing key ground, it still holds control of some territories. • State security forces and affiliated armed groups have to a lesser extent, resorted to arbitrary actions. • Reports of recruiting by Al-Shabaab continue.	• Al-Shabaab gaining strength and controlling large parts of Somalia and launching widespread attacks in the region. • The resurgence of armed groups • Violent extremist groups ally to establish an Islamic State in the Horn of Africa. • Increased number of refugees fleeing conflict • Insecurity due to rapid explosions.

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.8   INTERSTATE CONFLICTS

Conflicts over boundaries in the IGAD region include both internal demarcations and interstate borders. Demarcation of borders in the region has always been difficult. Active border disputes include South Sudan—Sudan, Uganda—Kenya, Kenya—Somalia, Uganda—South Sudan, Eritrea—Djibouti, Eritrea—Sudan, Ethiopia—Sudan, Kenya—South Sudan, and Sudan—Ethiopia. Member states are constantly negotiating over pieces of land, stretches of water bodies, and offshore blocks with new developments generating implications extending beyond the IGAD region.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for example, is a pillar of Ethiopia's internal development policy and internal security. It also has major ramifications for Ethiopia and other countries' foreign policy. Egypt and Sudan argue that the drop in the Nile River water flow due to GERD's construction will negatively impact their economies, and in Egypt jeopardize lives and livelihoods. So far, mediation efforts through the African Union and other players have yielded little success. There is a possibility that this contestation could lead to a violent conflict embroiling the larger region.

On a more positive note, some conflicts, like the land and boundary issues between Kenya and South Sudan, are dissipating, The issue of the international boundary of the Elemi Triangle between South Sudan and Kenya remains murky, but relations on the ground have improved, in part to an improved road connecting the areas, facilitating food deliveries and other supplies to South Sudan.

However, the formation of sub-national administrative units without clear boundaries continues to perpetuate boundary conflicts elsewhere. Speculation and exploration of natural resources in particular remain one of the critical factors for contestations of borders. Oil and

gas reserve discoveries can give rise to new border disputes, as the contested maritime border between Kenya and Somalia illustrates. Somalia refuted Kenya's claims over the 100,000 square kilometer block that may hold vast oil and gas deposits, but the offshore area claimed after Kenya reinterpreted the extension of the terrestrial border on colonial maps remains the focus of an emerging conflict, which could lead to a fight for control if the two countries do not solve it amicably. The examples are many, but most importantly, attention must be put to the manifestation of conflict early warning concerns.

The region is also experiencing local intra-boundary conflicts that spill over to the neighboring country—for instance, the boundary issues in Kenya's Marsabit county impact across the border in Ethiopia, while the dispute over Zone 4 and 5 boundaries in Ethiopia affects ethnic relations inside Kenya. The syndrome of cross-border ethnic alliances is a longstanding problem, and the case of the Kenya-Uganda border, where the Pokot in the two countries form alliances to raid other communities is actually just one theatre in the complicated North Rift conflict system.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

The limited water and grazing resources at border points in the region's arid and semi-arid areas are significant root causes of cross-border conflicts. The cross-border communities are mostly pastoralists who migrate to the neighboring country in search of water and pasture, and the cycle of increasingly prolonged droughts pose a challenge. This and the hard, if sometimes contested, borders represent a longstanding zone for natural resource conflicts complicated by the usual economic and political dynamics of border areas. The primary actors in this domain are governments and communities, while the secondary actors are security forces, the private sector, the media, people in the diaspora, and ethnic and clan leaders.

Table sixteen: Showing real and anticipated impacts of inter-state conflicts

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Border clashes and insecurity • Migration • Displacement	• Impaired diplomatic relations • Deathes • Destabilized trade and economy • Migration

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table seventeen: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for inter-state conflicts

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Joint committee to review and affirm boundaries • Education of citizens on boundaries and issues of sovereignty • The signing of peace agreements • Improved cross-border trade management.	• Strained diplomatic relations and legal contestations • Protests • Living with unresolved differences	• Failed negotiations • Failure to adhere to court decisions • Inter-state border conflicts intensify into open confrontations • Forceful occupation of the disputed territory • Outright war

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

4.9 PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)

The IGAD region has an estimated 30 million illegal arms. The lack of harmonized gun control policies in the region of firearms complicates a plethora of security concerns, like porous borders, political impunity, the difficulties of disarmament, inadequate security in frontier regions, and the proliferation of criminal and terrorist enterprises in different forms.

For example, in Djibouti the rural population in Obock, Tadjourah, and Dikhil, has witnessed the growth of violent crime due to small arms such as hunting rifles. In Kenya, the presence of an armed militia with sophisticated weapons alone can trigger clan conflicts in pastoral areas. Despite launching civilian disarmament in Tonj, South Sudan authorities wonder what will happen to the neighbors who are not currently disarmed. The country is already battling armed criminals and armed robberies. In Somalia, the number of criminal gangs has increased significantly in recent years, especially in Somaliland and Puntland.

CEWARN's early warning about increasing banditry attacks cannot resolve the problem without more effective control over the circulation of small arms. It goes without saying that despite regional efforts to control the proliferation of SALWs, the challenge remains. Ongoing conflicts in the IGAD and Gulf region make SALWs easily accessible. Regional governments' efforts in conducting coordinated regional disarmament exercises have achieved limited success in curbing the proliferation of SALW across the region.

ROOT CAUSES AND ACTORS

This key conflict issue would be less problematic without the presence of an illegal arms market. The market, in turn, is sustained by conflicts in neighboring countries, weak policies on disarmament, high unemployment, endemic inter-clan and communal conflicts, and revenge killings. The availability of weapons is compounded by the illegal use of legal arms. The key actors here are armed and unemployed youth and security personnel who have access to arms. The secondary actors include policymakers, business people, political leadership, and clan elders.

Table eighteen: Showing real and anticipated impacts of proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Impact	
Real Impact (RI)	**Anticipated Impact (AI)**
• Forced migration • Chronic communal tensions • Effects of gender violence e.g. trauma and STDs • Stunted development	• Rise in organized crime and mafias • Increase in anonymous shootings and revenge killings • General lawlessness • Increase in SGVB cases

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

Table nineteen: Best, status quo, and worst cases scenarios for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Best case scenario	Status quo	Worst case scenario
• Increased awareness and community dialogue leading to voluntary disarmament • Reconciliation of rival communities • Coordinated disarmament among member states	• Disarmament exercises have taken place in many IGAD member states, but the issue remains a concern.	• Forceful disarmament and confrontation between armed groups sparks increased violence. • Destruction of property • Continued failure to undertake coordinated regional disarmament due to lack of political will and resources • Emergence of new rebel groups

Source: Validation workshop of the draft report on regional conflict early warning and scenarios (13-15 April, 2021; Bishoftu, Ethiopia)

5.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the hierarchy of conflict early warning concerns, the IGAD region's most urgent issues include, but are not limited to, youth unemployment, mismanaged electoral processes, ethnic polarities, land and natural resource conflicts, extreme climate fluctuations, and the effects of COVID-19. Conflict early warning issues directly linked to food security are exacerbated by the effects of climate change and environmental challenges in the form of prolonged drought, floods, and unexpected events like the 2020 locust invasion.

Five of the seven IGAD Member States have either concluded their elections recently or are approaching a new election cycle. Elections have often been triggers for conflicts highlighting the self-reinforcing matrix of intimidation, protests and riots, violent security interventions, arbitrary arrests, human rights abuse, and more. To mitigate the syndrome, his report recommends that:

- Member states to work with a formed joint regional electoral commission that ensures the implementation progress for national elections fulfilling specific minimum requirements pertaining to the full electoral cycle and its aftermath when required.

- All IGAD member states need to sign and ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UNATT, 2014) on issues of small arms and light weapons proliferation, a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons.

- Governments recognize that home-grown solutions can work best in areas of border contestations, and that bringing border communities together to find mutually acceptable solutions is the best approach for ensuring sustainable peace.

- Joint security surveillance is required to manage movements of pastoralists, locust invasions, activities of terrorists and to share information about other emerging threats with relevant authorities.

- To curb youth unemployment, restructuring education curriculum to fit the needed skillsets including vocational skills training is key. Incentivizing productive sectors like industry and services to avail internship programs for the youth can provide critical support, as will involving the youth in peace building and policy formulation processes.

- Climate change is real; there is therefore a need to equip meteorological and disaster management institutions to issue earlier forecasts, while intensifying campaigns encouraging communities to accept government policies on environmental protection programmes.

- COVID-19 is a serious threat, and regional measures are needed that can synch with national and traditional health promotion campaigns. This can also enhance engagement of communities, build trust, and improve state-citizen relations in regard to coping with the hardship that COVID-19 and other health issues bring.

- Regional social cohesion programs should be introduced to allow communities who often clash and fight, or kill each other to co-exist harmoniously and create interdependence for example by benefitting from shared social services and other socio-economic amenities.