



# National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: *Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*

Simplified Version 2011



NSC



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**National Conflict Mapping**  
**and Analysis: *Peace and***  
***Conflict Trends in Kenya***

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
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>TABLE OF CONTENTS.....</b>  | <b>iii</b> |
| Acronyms and Abbreviations.....  | v          |
| Foreword.....  | 1          |
| Acknowledgement.....   | 4          |
| <b>1.0 INTRODUCTION.....</b>   | <b>6</b>   |
| 1.1 Context of Conflict Mapping and Analysis.....                        | 6          |
| 1.2 Context of Conflict Mapping and Analysis.....                        | 6          |
| 1.3 Accelerating or Triggering Factors.....                              | 7          |
| 1.4 The Phases and Dynamics of Conflict.....                             | 7          |
| 1.5 Goal and Objectives of the Study.....                                | 8          |
| 1.6 Research Questions.....  | 9          |
| 1.7 Significance of the Study.....                                       | 9          |
| 1.8 Study Design and Methodology.....                                    | 9          |
| <b>2.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS.....</b>  | <b>11</b>  |
| 2.1 Conflict causes.....   | 12         |
| <b>3.0 CONFLICT MAPPING MATRIX.....</b>                                  | <b>15</b>  |
| <b>4.0 SCENARIO BUILDING.....</b>  | <b>21</b>  |
| 4.1 SCENARIO ONE: Status quo scenario.....                               | 22         |
| 4.3 SCENARIO THREE: Best-case scenario.....                              | 27         |
| <b>5.0 CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK.....</b> | <b>31</b>  |
| <b>5.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>   | <b>36</b>  |

## The National Conflict Early Warning and Response System for Kenya



Source: [www.nscpeace.go.ke](http://www.nscpeace.go.ke)

*There are a number of different theoretical frameworks for analyzing contemporary conflicts. This Publication is based on a multidisciplinary approach that uses a number of different analytical 'lenses' to examine and develop responses to violent conflict. Important recent advances in the understanding of conflict come from the 'political economy' approach. This focuses on the political and economic interests of those engaged in conflict and draws attention to those who exploit conflict for their own ends. If the political economy of conflict brings opportunities, there will be strong interests in perpetuating and managing conflict for purposes of personal gain. Interventions which ignore these interests risk fuelling the conflict.*

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| ASAL       | Arid and Semi-Arid Land                               |
| CAG        | Conflict Analysis Group                               |
| CBO        | Community-Based Organisation                          |
| CEWERU     | Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit        |
| CIPEV      | Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence     |
| CPMR       | Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution         |
| CSO        | Civil Society Organisation                            |
| DC         | District Commissioner                                 |
| DFID       | Department for International Development              |
| DPC        | District Peace Committee                              |
| DRM        | Dispute Resolution Mechanism                          |
| EAC        | East African Community                                |
| EACJ       | East African Community Court of Justice               |
| ECK        | Electoral Commission of Kenya                         |
| FBO        | Faith-Based Organisation                              |
| FEWS NET   | Famine Early Warning Systems Network                  |
| FGD        | Focus Group Discussion                                |
| Ford Kenya | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy- Kenya         |
| GEMA       | Gikuyu Embu Meru Association                          |
| ICC        | International Criminal Court                          |
| ICJ        | International Court of Justice                        |
| IDI        | In-depth Interview                                    |
| IDP        | Internally Displaced Person                           |
| IEBC       | Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission       |
| IGAD       | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development           |
| IGADD      | Inter-government Authority on Drought and Development |
| IIBRC      | Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission      |

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| IIEC    | Interim Independent Electoral Commission                             |
| IPPG    | Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group                                    |
| ITDG-EA | Inter-mediate Technology Development Group – East Africa             |
| KACC    | Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission                                     |
| KADU    | Kenya African Democratic Union                                       |
| KANU    | Kenya African National Union   |
| KHREC   | Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission                  |
| KII     | Key Informant Interview  |
| KNCHR   | Kenya National Commission on Human Rights                            |
| KNFP    | Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons           |
| KPR     | Kenya Police Reserve   |
| KPU     | Kenya People’s Union   |
| KWS     | Kenya Wildlife Society   |
| LEA     | Law Enforcement Agencies   |
| MOU     | Memorandum of Understanding  |
| NARC    | National Rainbow Coalition   |
| NCEP    | National Civic Education Program                                     |
| NCIC    | National Cohesion and Integration Commission                         |
| NEMA    | National Environmental Management Authority                          |
| NEP     | North Eastern Province   |
| NESC    | National Economic and Social Council                                 |
| NFD     | Northern Frontier District   |
| NGO     | Non-Governmental Organisation  |
| NRT     | Northern Rangeland Trust   |
| NSC     | National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management |
| NSIS    | National Security Intelligence Service                               |
| ODM     | Orange Democratic Movement   |
| PEV     | Post Election Violence   |
| PRC     | Peace and Reconciliation Commission                                  |

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| RC      | Regional Commissioner  |
| RECSA   | Regional Centre on Small Arms  |
| REGABU  | Rendille Gabra Buriiji Alliance  |
| SALW    | Small Arms and Light Weapons   |
| SLDF    | Sabaot Land Defence Force  |
| TJRC    | Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission                             |
| TUMEONA | Tubcha, Uyam/Uruwen, Matarbah, Elegeza, Odhola, and Nahgan clan alliance |
| UNDP    | United Nations Development Programme                                     |
| USAID   | United States Agency for International Development                       |





## Foreword

The Post-Election Violence (PEV) of 2008 was unprecedented both in scale and intensity. Apart from the resource based conflicts in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) in Kenya and the bouts of “tribal” clashes marking the 1992 and 1997 General Elections, Kenya was considered an island of peace in a region of turmoil. The PEV shattered that image, much to the chagrin of all and sundry.

The signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement (NARA) in February 2008 brought the PEV to an overt end, thrusting the Country onto an extensive reform path. Addressing the root causes of the PEV was one such path of reform agenda as the country sought to open a new chapter and rebuild its social, economic, cultural and political fabric. Institutions such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) were established and mandated to unearth the genesis of the violence and ensure that the country will never witness again the repeat of such post-election mayhem.

In order to contribute to the national peacebuilding agenda, the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, Office of the President, through the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC), commissioned a study in 2010 to map and analyze conflicts in the country and anticipate possible peace and conflict scenarios as the country moves closer to the next General Elections scheduled for 2012 or 2013. The study also sought to make recommendations on how to prevent and or manage conflicts in order to deliver a peaceful and successful elections and political transition thereafter.

As you will find out, this study examines core factors contributing to conflict from a multidimensional perspective, with a view to provoking systemic action that would promote peace. The conflict analysis was comprehensively undertaken within the six thematic foci of political, security, economic, legal, socio-cultural and environmental.

One of the astonishing findings that peace stakeholders need to be wary of is the realization that religious differences are a significant potential conflict factor in Kenya as was illustrated during the 2010 referendum. This is a conflict factor that had not been given due attention but the referendum process was an eye opener. We must all do whatever we can to ensure that religious differences do not become a major factor of conflict in our society.

One of the most important aspects of this study is the formulation and anticipation of possible peace and conflict scenarios especially as the country approaches the next general elections. According to the study, the best case scenario that all Kenyans yearn for is that we will have successful and peaceful elections. This scenario builds on the 2010 referendum that was largely peaceful and UWIANO initiative that ensured that conflict indicators were reported on time and response mobilized rapidly.

On the other hand, the implementation of the Constitution will in the long run tackle some of the root causes of the conflicts such as historical injustices, uneven distribution (access) of resources and opportunities and above all address integrity and leadership issues in a bid to make our political process issue based.

In the same breadth, the study anticipates a worst case scenario if conflict prevention measures are not put in place in a timely and efficient manner. The worst case scenario is that the ghost of election years (electoral violence as the case has been since 1992) might raise its ugly head again. It is feared that the unresolved issues that led to PEV as well as the IDPs question might stalk peace again if they are not conclusively addressed. There has also been an upsurge of political parties and shaky alliances founded on ethnic calculations. Hence, ethnicity has become a quick political mobilization tool, and this partly explains why electoral processes have been triggers of violence, and it is feared that the next electoral process might take a similar trend.

These contemplated scenarios are helpful in putting in place contingency measures in anticipation of any flare-ups as well as maximizing opportunities for best case scenario, i.e. successful elections and political transitions. In this aspect, the NSC through the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, in partnership with other actors is keen to mobilize efforts and resources in order to contribute to a successful election.

This National Conflict Mapping and Analysis Report, is not entirely about electoral related violence but also for general posterity. It highlights key conflict issues and factors that need to be addressed in order to make Kenya a peaceful and stable country, as well as ingredients necessary for the realization of Kenya's Vision 2030. Enactment and implementation of the peace related policies will also go a long way in institutionalizing peace building structures and approaches in the country with cumulative result being a secure and stable country.

I hope this Report will form not only an interesting piece and reference material but will inform interventions by various actors with regard to peacebuilding and conflict management in Kenya in line with the CPMR Framework herein. For consistency and cross-referencing, this simplified version should be read alongside the main report.



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**PERMANENT SECRETARY**  
**MINISTRY OF STATE FOR PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION**  
**AND INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**



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Lastly, it is important to note our appreciation for support from our families, friends and partners, who put up with erratic and long hours, absences from home and sometimes editorial emergencies. Their support and listening skills contributed to the completion of this publication.



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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This simplified version of the study on conflicts in Kenya is drawn from the main publication, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*.

### 1.1 Context of Conflict Mapping and Analysis

The search to find new and more effective ways of resolving conflicts is a major preoccupation in today's world, Kenya included. Conflict resolution and transformation have enjoyed increasing attention in research and policy discourse dealing with the dynamics of contemporary conflict. The nexus between political, security, economic, social, legal, and environmental factors in conflict have played a defining role in the country's conflict transformation process during the 1990s and early 2000. An understanding of the dynamics of conflict in Kenya is necessary if we are to determine the most appropriate means of mobilizing early responses to violent conflicts in the country. This requires knowledge of conflict issues and their causes, durations of conflict (short-lived, sporadic or protracted) and attentiveness to the identities, interests and concerns of actors among other factors. Most broadly, violent conflicts in Kenya can be said to be directly linked to factors that contribute to the escalation of conflict which can be categorized as structural factors, accelerators, and triggers. Theories on how and why violent conflicts occur distinguish between structural factors on the one hand, and accelerating or triggering factors on the other. Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. It helps development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context.

### 1.2 Context of Conflict Mapping and Analysis

Structural factors, which must be viewed on a long-term horizon, are those which create a potential climate for violent conflict without, however, making its eruption inevitable. They include such interrelated political, social and economic factors as population density, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the state of the resource base, the structure and ethnic make-up of society, and the history of inter-group relations. Certain patterns of socio-economic organization can result in a high degree of vulnerability to conflict. For instance, a

politically-dominant group controls the state and access to wealth, education and status, often suffer from a high-degree of vulnerability to conflict.

### **1.3 Accelerating or Triggering Factors**

Accelerating or triggering factors are the events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict. Since triggering factors depend heavily upon the specific context, it is not possible to list them systematically. Some examples include: economic decline, changes in the degree of internal state cohesion; shifts in internal control of the central authority, including the military; change in the internal distribution of power, including access to government power and privilege; shipments of (small) arms; interventions of neighboring states, regional powers and organizations; and large movements of people and capital.

### **1.4 The Phases and Dynamics of Conflict**

Conflict is not a static, unchanging state of affairs but rather a dynamic process. While distinct phases can be distinguished, they do not necessarily follow a sequential pattern. A combination of factors will generally determine whether a conflict escalates or recedes. Hence, the passage from one phase to another is not necessarily the result of a single event or factor at the exact moment of transition. Notwithstanding the diversity of the causes and escalators of conflict, almost all crises can usefully be subdivided into four main, difficult to separate phases, as follows:

- i. Situations of submerged tensions;
- ii. Situations of rising tensions;
- iii. Eruption phases of open confrontation and violent conflict;
- iv. Fragile transitional and post-conflict situations.

Most analyses on conflicts in Kenya have been inadvertently area-specific – by predominantly focusing on hotspots of violent conflicts (especially pastoralist-inhabited areas and zones plagued by electoral violence)<sup>1</sup>. Some areas have been depicted as perpetually violence-prone while others are seen as constant havens of peace. The widespread nature of the 2008 post-election violence emphasised the need for a nationwide analysis of conflict.

A holistic espousal of conflict as arising when two or more groups have incompatible goals and interests should hopefully help in expanding the scope of analysis to include all factors against which such inter-group aims are formed and competed for. It is in this regard that this study undertakes to nationally examine conflicts in Kenya on the basis of the six relevant variables: political, security, legal, economic, socio-cultural and environmental.

## 1.5 Goal and Objectives of the Study

The overall goal of conducting conflict analysis is to improve the effectiveness of development policy and Programmes in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction in Kenya. The specific objectives include:

- i. To identify lessons in order to generate evidence based data and guidance for policymakers and practitioners to improve the conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding impacts in the country
- ii. To promote uptake of such good practice
- iii. To put the links between development and peacebuilding on the agenda of relevant national and international actors through advocacy, outreach and networking

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For instance, in British Council, Ministry of Justice, & Peace Net-Kenya, *Conflict Mapping: An Insider's Perspective (Action Research) Report on National Conflict Mapping for Active Citizens Programme*, Nairobi: Peace Net Kenya, 2011, the report, although attempting a national mapping of conflict, zeroes in on seven districts, most of which are violence prone.



## 1.6 Research Questions

The research study is guided by the following framework for conflict analysis:

- i. What is the context and issues of the conflict?? What is the history of the conflict? Which areas are specifically affected?
- ii. Who are the main actors in the conflict? Who are the main actors in the political, security, economic, socio-cultural, legal and environmental spheres? What are their goals and interests? How do they relate to one another? How can they support peace or further the conflict?
- iii. What are the major causes of the conflict? What underlying factors in the society create the preconditions for violence? What other factors contribute to violence?
- iv. What are the dynamics of the conflict? What have been the stages and patterns, and what are the current and past trends? How are these evolving over time? Are there windows of opportunity for peace? What scenarios can be developed to determine the possible future of the conflict?

## 1.7 Significance of the Study

Violent conflicts and situations of insecurity can greatly worsen development. A strategic conflict analysis provides a deeper understanding of the conflict context and is an important source of information for use in long-term planning regarding how to design, implement, and evaluate policies, strategies, and development Programmes in areas affected by violent conflict and insecurity.

## 1.8 Study Design and Methodology

The aim of Conflict Analysis is to better understand the historical and structural antecedents of violent conflict and to better understand what converts latent conflict into open conflict or intensifies existing open conflict. The methodology, in conflict analysis has focused on analysis of conflict structures, triggers, actors and dynamics.

This research relied both on secondary and primary data. Secondary literature was useful both for identification of gaps in previous conflict analyses and enrichment of this study. The literature reviewed was of conceptual

and practical relevance to each of the thematic areas of study. Such literature included reports of commissions of inquiry, government reports, academic and practitioners' publications and/or outputs, and information from media sources.


The survey was carried out between July and September 2010; primary data collection mainly relied on focus group discussions, questionnaires, and key informant interviews. The regions covered included North Rift, Central Rift, South Rift, Central (province), Nyanza, Western, Nairobi, Upper Eastern, Lower Eastern (consisting of both Central and Lower Eastern), North Eastern and Coast. Qualitative data was collected using focus group discussions and key informant interviews (in some cases with the help of research assistants). There were a total of 38 focus group discussions with an average of eight participants each. These were enriched with key informant interviews with over 100 respondents. Quantitative data was gathered with the help of questionnaires administered in all the regions. 1725 questionnaires were filled and returned. Based on this, the margin of error was 2.36%. The questionnaires targeted civil society organisation representatives, members of District Peace Committees and the general public. The target group for key informant interviews was determined by each researcher's thematic focus, but essentially critical peace and conflict stakeholders were covered.

## 2.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS

Kenya experiences different types of conflicts, both internally and cross-border. Following the post-election violence of 2007-2008, the greatest in magnitude in Kenya's history, the country has now been thrust into an extensive reform agenda. With the promulgation of the new constitution on 27 August 2010, the provisions of the new dispensation speak directly towards resolving some of the root causes of conflict that have plagued the nation.

This study examines core factors contributing to conflict from a multidimensional perspective, with a view to provoking systemic action that would promote peace. The conflict analysis was comprehensively undertaken within the six thematic foci of political, security, economic, legal, sociocultural and environmental.

In general, a majority of respondents (30 per cent per cent) believe that politics contributes the most to conflict, followed by security concerns.



The most striking observation in the findings above was the relatively low prominence awarded to environmental degradation as a cause of conflict. However, the reality of the nexus between environmental degradation and conflict provides for grim prospects. As a fairly new construct in understanding conflict, environmental causes are often overlooked or are indistinguishable from other more traditional causes of conflict. Environmental concerns are mostly neglected in the sense that they are not considered to be an important cause of conflict and this is reflected in the research findings, with less than 5 per cent per cent considering the environment to be a contributor to conflict. Conversely, with the added impact of climate change in accelerating environmental degradation already caused by man, there is every indication that environmental conflicts will abound as resources grow scarcer.

## 2.1 Conflict causes

This study demonstrates the centrality of ethnicity and its politicisation in conflict – 50 per cent of respondents believe Kenyan politics is influenced by ethnicity. This study's position is that politics is the fulcrum around which all the other forms of conflicts are anchored, although there is great interplay among politics, legal, security, economic and environmental factors.

Ethnicity has been politicised by elites who are accused of sowing divisions. Formation of ethnic alliances, politicising the formation of electoral and administrative units, and electoral violence have been major aspects of ethnic dimensions of political conflicts. Majimbo rhetoric during elections has been known to feed conflict, while creation of counties is bound to create new fronts for conflict. For instance, in Transmara, there is a persisting concern that the battle for political dominance between the Masai and Kipsigis groups might fester into worse conflict.

Further, marginalisation of communities has fed apathy, particularly in the predominantly pastoralist Northern Kenya. In this way, the state has been an instrument of balkanisation – through the personalisation of political power. Worse still, the weakness of the political party system, characterised by poor internal party democracy, defections and wrangles further foments conflict. Parties' alliance-seeking habits, often informed by ethnic calculations, cement a divisive and conflict-generating political dispensation. Incitement and/or propaganda,

be it in political or localised intergroup dynamics, was viewed by 53 per cent of respondents to be contributing to conflict.

The strongest interface between politics and security is in the political instrumentation of organised gangs that are often the primary actors in electoral violence. Whereas most respondents (40.3 per cent) do not consider organised gangs as crucial contributors to conflict, a significant proportion (14.4 per cent) feel that they contribute to conflict to a great extent, 19.9 per cent selected moderate extent per cent and to 25.3 per cent little extent per cent.

Security concerns extend to property and general safety; most respondents (48.5 per cent) felt their land and property are not safe. This fear is more pronounced in Coast. An even bigger proportion (63.7 per cent) said they are not safe on roads or highways. But 60.7 per cent felt that they and their families were safe, while 53 per cent felt that their neighbourhoods were safe.

A significant proportion of respondents (33 per cent) implicated the police in contributing to conflict to some degree. However, 44.9 per cent felt law enforcement agencies are effective, while 34 per cent felt the contrary. On a slightly more positive note, arguably connected to the current extensive police reform process, 37 per cent of respondents said community policing is effective, with 27.8 per cent saying it is not.

Sociocultural factors contributing to conflict include the predominant view (40 per cent of respondents) that ethnic and/or clan differences contribute to conflict. This is reinforced by the fact that ethnicity has dictated most facets of Kenyan life, such as resource allocation and politics.

Despite traditionally being a relatively low-key conflict factor, the 2010 referendum illustrated that religious differences are a significant potential conflict factor in Kenya. Some 34.8 per cent felt religious intolerance did not contribute to conflict, 27 per cent felt it did to a small extent and 24.9 per cent felt it had moderate potential to contribute to conflict.

Another cause of conflict with strong sociocultural linkages is the practice of livestock raiding or cattle rustling.

Cattle rustling, although predominantly viewed as inconsequential to conflict dynamics by 39 per cent (the majority of whom are sedentary groups), is another significant conflict trigger, especially among pastoralist groups. Twenty-seven per cent of respondents viewed rustling as contributing to conflict to a great extent.

In legal terms, law can act as both a cause and trigger of conflict. As a cause, law and the application of the law engender conflict by commission as well as by omission. There may exist deficient legal provisions that are manifestly unjust and perpetuate conflicts. More often, however, legal provisions indirectly contribute to conflict by omission, by a failure to apply legal provisions, the limited scope of legal provisions, or their absence all together.

A history of impunity makes it difficult to differentiate between the failings of the legal system and the bureaucratic authoritarianism characterized by corruption and patrimonialism.

For example, the government decided to establish a settlement scheme in the Nakuru/Engurone/Kiptagich extension forest area to resettle the Ogiek people who had previously been evicted from their customary landholding, which had been gazetted as forest. However, in establishing the settlement scheme, the provisions of the Forest Act were not adhered to. It illustrates how the law can be manipulated to enhance certain interests, the result of which is the production or perpetuation of conflict.

That said, the new constitutional dispensation and the wide-reaching reform agenda required for its full implementation portends well for the future. It protects and promotes individuals and communities in Kenya and provides effective avenues for the resolution and mediation of conflicts and disputes.

Economic drivers of conflicts include poverty and inequality, unemployment, land and competition for scarce resources. A total of 46 per cent held that land issues contribute to conflict, 38 per cent felt that competition for resources contributes to conflict, while 54 per cent felt poverty contributes to conflict. Comprehensively addressing the myriad economic concerns in the country is crucial for resolving structural causes of conflict.

### 3.0 CONFLICT MAPPING MATRIX

| REGION               | CONFLICT FACTORS  | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|----------------------|---|--|
| <b>North Eastern</b> | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalisation</li> <li>• Clanism and clan-based violence</li> <li>• Land tenure systems</li> <li>• Border conflicts</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Breakdown of grazing management systems</li> <li>• Proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW)</li> <li>• Diminishing roles of traditional authority structures</li> <li>• Influx of refugees</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Banditry</li> <li>• Boundary delineation</li> <li>• Illegal allocation of land especially in urban areas</li> </ul> | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth</li> <li>• Clans</li> <li>• Politicians</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Media/vernacular stations</li> <li>• Clan opinion leaders</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Faith-based organisations (FBOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs)</li> <li>• International non-governmental organisations (INGOs)</li> <li>• Elders</li> <li>• Women</li> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Security forces</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Local authorities</li> </ul> |
| <b>South Rift</b>    | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Historical injustice in administration of land tenure</li> <li>• Caveat of title deeds in some parts of Mau Forest</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic intolerance and mistrust</li> <li>• Low scale disputes</li> <li>• Human encroachment into wildlife reserves</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral politics</li> </ul>  | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth and morans</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Media/vernacular stations</li> <li>• Community elders</li> </ul>  |

| REGION               | CONFLICT FACTORS  | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|----------------------|---|--|
|                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forced eviction from Mau Forest Complex</li> </ul>   | <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSOs, CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Community elders</li> <li>• Local authorities</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Lower Eastern</b> | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land tenure systems</li> <li>• Religious intolerance</li> <li>• Weak formal justice systems</li> <li>• Divergent land use needs</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Boundary disputes</li> <li>• Negative ethnicity</li> <li>• Exploitation of minerals</li> <li>• Business rivalry</li> <li>• Illegal Immigrants</li> <li>• Livestock theft</li> <li>• Drugs and trafficking</li> <li>• Erosion of cultural values (tourism and prevalent child prostitution)</li> <li>• Radical criminal groups/armed gangs and armed communities</li> <li>• Issuance of IDs</li> <li>• Conflict between formal and informal legal systems (e.g. Sharia vs. formal laws)</li> <li>• Clash for water resources (farmers and pastoralists)</li> <li>• Clash over need for access roads to beaches</li> <li>• Destruction of mangrove swamps</li> <li>• Human-wildlife conflict</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political incitement</li> </ul> | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth</li> <li>• Political parties/politicians</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs (MRC armed wing)</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local and foreign investors</li> <li>• Opinion leaders/ elders</li> <li>• Media/vernacular stations</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Witchdoctors</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> <li>• Interfaith groups,</li> <li>• Foreign and local investors</li> <li>• The Kaya leaders</li> <li>• Spiritual leaders from mosques and churches</li> </ul> |
| <b>Central Rift</b>  | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Historical injustices/land tenure systems</li> <li>• Enforcement of minority rights</li> <li>• Cultural practices, e.g. FGM</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic contestation for land</li> <li>• Ethnic power politics</li> </ul>  | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> </ul>  |



| REGION                 | CONFLICT FACTORS  | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|------------------------|---|--|
| <b>Central Rift</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gerrymandering</li> <li>• Business rivalry</li> <li>• Livestock theft</li> <li>• IDP challenges</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political incitement</li> <li>• Politicisation of environmental concerns (e.g. Mau and land issues)</li> <li>• Arson</li> </ul>   | <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Security forces</li> <li>• CDF committees</li> <li>• Ranch owners</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Upper Eastern</b>   | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalisation</li> <li>• Ethnicity intolerance</li> <li>• Retrogressive cultural practices, e.g. killing for bravery</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicisation of identity</li> <li>• Cattle rustling</li> <li>• Small arms trafficking and proliferation</li> <li>• Ethnic and political supremacy battles</li> <li>• Competition for water and pasture</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political and cultural Incitement</li> </ul>                                       | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KPR</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> <li>• Youth</li> <li>• Local politicians (MPs, councillors)</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• NGOs, CBOs, FBOs and INGOs</li> <li>• Security forces</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traditional leaders</li> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• NGOs and CBOs, FBOs and INGOs</li> </ul> |
| <b>Central Eastern</b> | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty</li> <li>• Identity consciousness</li> <li>• Weak justice system</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic business rivalry</li> <li>• Inter-ethnic political rivalry</li> <li>• Fears of gerrymandering and dominance</li> <li>• Grievances based on appointments to head corporations</li> <li>• Land allocation/acquisition</li> <li>• Land grabbing</li> <li>• Corruption</li> <li>• Drug use</li> <li>• Identity politics</li> <li>• Small arms proliferation</li> <li>• Perceived unfair justice system</li> </ul> | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic groups</li> <li>• Organised groups</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elders</li> <li>• Police</li> <li>• Casual labourers</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Courts</li> <li>• Police</li> <li>• DPCs</li> </ul>   |

| REGION                 | CONFLICT FACTORS   | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Central Eastern</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human-wildlife conflict</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections</li> <li>• Political incitement</li> </ul>   |  |
| <b>Nairobi</b>         | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak judicial systems</li> <li>• Bureaucracy within the security sector</li> <li>• Uncoordinated chain of command within the security sector</li> <li>• Negative ethnicity</li> <li>• Ancestral claims over land</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral violence</li> <li>• Irregular allocation of public land</li> <li>• Politicisation of ethnicity</li> <li>• Political use of organised gangs</li> <li>• Land and property misappropriation</li> <li>• Landlord-tenant conflicts</li> <li>• Organised crime</li> <li>• Unfair business rivalry</li> <li>• Unplanned city expansion</li> <li>• Youth unemployment</li> <li>• Illegal dumping of (hazardous) waste</li> <li>• Pollution of water resources</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incitement</li> <li>• Elections</li> <li>• Withholding legal rent and fees</li> <li>• Illegal occupation of land and property</li> <li>• Evictions</li> <li>• Demolitions</li> </ul> | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs – the Mungiki</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Faith-based groups</li> <li>• Hawkers</li> <li>• Construction workers</li> <li>• Football hooligans</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investors</li> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• Pastoralist herders</li> <li>• INGOs</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Security forces</li> <li>• Faith-based organisations and religious leaders</li> </ul> |
| <b>Western</b>         | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalisation</li> <li>• Inequalities in land allocation</li> <li>• Poor security infrastructure</li> <li>• Weak legal protection for land</li> <li>• Poor human rights enforcement</li> <li>• Border exits and entries</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceived ethnic deployment of provincial administrators</li> </ul>  | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Dissidents - Sabao land DF</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> </ul>  |

| REGION            | CONFLICT FACTORS  | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|-------------------|---|--|
| <b>Western</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reactive government interventions</li> <li>• Political patronage</li> <li>• Administrative and electoral boundary disputes</li> <li>• Land disputes</li> <li>• Persisting IDP problem</li> <li>• Mismanagement of public resources and funds</li> <li>• Negative ethnicity</li> <li>• Diminishing influence of elders</li> <li>• Alcohol and drug abuse</li> <li>• Rural-urban migration</li> <li>• Small arms prevalence</li> <li>• Livestock theft</li> <li>• Criminality (burglary, theft, rape)</li> <li>• Lack of confidence in police</li> <li>• Low confidence in formal legal systems</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incitement</li> <li>• Forced evictions</li> </ul> | <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Internal security</li> <li>• DPCs</li> </ul> <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Morans</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• KPRs</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> <li>• Laibons</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Internal security</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• CDF committees</li> </ul> |
| <b>North Rift</b> | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalisation</li> <li>• Land tenure system</li> <li>• Boundary/border dispute</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicisation of identity</li> <li>• Cattle rustling</li> <li>• Small arms trafficking and proliferation</li> <li>• Competition for water and pasture</li> <li>• Negative ethnicity</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural practices</li> <li>• Incitement</li> <li>• Arms race</li> <li>• Banditry</li> </ul>   | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Labourers from large farms</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs - the Mungiki</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INGOs, CBOs, and FBOs</li> <li>• Cooperative groups</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Political parties</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• Internal security</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Business investors</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• CDF committee</li> </ul>                                     |

| REGION         | CONFLICT FACTORS  | PEACE AND CONFLICT ACTORS  |
|----------------|---|--|
| <b>Central</b> | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land tenure system</li> <li>• Class formation</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intra-ethnic competition</li> <li>• Succession politics</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> <li>• Disputes over inheritance</li> <li>• Mismanagement of cooperative societies</li> <li>• Business rivalry</li> <li>• Diminishing returns from cash crops</li> <li>• Alcoholism</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extrajudicial killings</li> <li>• Vigilantism</li> </ul>  | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Football hooliganism</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> <li>• Youths</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Security forces</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Business investors</li> <li>• CDF committees</li> </ul> |
| <b>Nyanza</b>  | <p><i>Structural</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalisation</li> <li>• Historical injustices</li> </ul> <p><i>Proximate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicisation of ethnicity</li> <li>• Disputes over electoral and administrative boundaries</li> <li>• Landlord-tenant conflicts</li> <li>• Business rivalry</li> <li>• Class struggle</li> <li>• Perceived economic ‘sabotage’</li> <li>• Foreign direct investment and land and social justice concerns</li> <li>• Land-use disputes</li> <li>• Poor waste disposal</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Triggers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incitement</li> <li>• Livestock theft</li> <li>• Elections</li> <li>• Extrajudicial killings</li> </ul> | <p><i>Primary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Football hooliganism</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• Organised gangs</li> </ul> <p><i>Secondary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBOs and FBOs</li> <li>• INGOs</li> <li>• Youths</li> </ul> <p><i>Tertiary actors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial administration</li> <li>• CSOs</li> <li>• Security forces</li> <li>• DPCs</li> <li>• Business investors</li> <li>• CDF committees</li> </ul> |

## 4.0 SCENARIO BUILDING

The security sector is bound to experience accelerated reforms, especially in the light of the new constitution that provides for a more unified police forces' command structure and human rights protection. But overseeing the security sector reform process requires the facilitative role of political support, with commitment to transparency in effecting the changes.

The economic prospects for the future are positive, considering the presence of good policy intentions, such as Kenya's Vision 2030. Far from being a political manifesto, this blueprint shall guide development policy regardless of regime changes – and government policy shall be aligned to it. Further, there are new and/or existing institutional structures such as the National Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Revenue Allocation, and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission as well as guarantees on socioeconomic rights in the current constitution's Bill of Rights. But sustenance of these strides and implementation of economic programmes are dependent on political stability and goodwill.

The legal developments in the country are equally promising, with the new constitution entrenching human rights protection and securing the independence of the judiciary. The constitution also allows for members of the public to litigate on structural causes of conflict – for instance, holding the state accountable for failure to provide services and/or protect human rights of a group. There are also positive steps being undertaken to institutionalise informal structures through the peace policy under formulation through the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC). However, there is a need to depersonalise the judicial reform process and institutionalise it. Similarly, the success of these legal developments is reliant on a nurturing political environment.

The sociocultural environment shall equally gain from the increasing emphasis on legislative frameworks that protect minority rights, criminalise hate speech, and provide resolution mechanisms for historical injustices.

It is also promising that there is increasing consciousness about ethnicity and its discriminative influences on appointments, for example drawing from public service audits that are revealing under-representation of

minority groups in the civil service. This is contributing to a growing national consciousness on patriotism, and the advantages of ethnic tolerance. However, politics has proven to be the most powerful means through which mobilisation of groups on ethnic terms has occurred, as well as the avenue for hate speech.

#### **4.1 SCENARIO ONE: Status quo scenario**

A number of factors will contribute to the *Status quo* scenario:

##### **Ethnicity**

There is currently a mix of heightened ethnic consciousness informed by alliance-seeking efforts of the political elites as well as sensitivity to the ills of ethnic discrimination thanks to the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) work. The political environment is highly fractious, as political leaders try to outsmart each other in forming winning alliances in efforts to succeed President Kibaki at the end of his term. Most of the efforts at forming political coalitions have been ethnic in nature.

There is also the creation of counties, which promise to create new centres of inter-ethnic political competition. As noted earlier. The predominant view is that ethnicity continues to influence politics.

Alongside this, there is the new constitution's creation of a bicameral legislature, which has a senate and parliament. Some politicians are seen to be angling for the senator seats with a view to controlling broader electoral zones in their regions, which are ethnically defined.

Also, there are persistent concerns that the scars of the ethnically motivated electoral conflicts aren't healed, and this is evidenced by failed IDP resettlement efforts in some parts of the country. Inter-ethnic mistrust persists.

There is also the politicisation of The Hague cases against six prominent leaders at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This has ethnic undertones and has influenced the nature of political alliances leaders are seeking.

## Elections

Respondents appeared apprehensive about the next general elections, with 67, 3 per cent indicating that the elections could be very violent, slightly violent or unpredictable. It was however positive to note that 30, 3 per cent of respondents believed that the next general elections would be peaceful. Perceptions were that the new constitution has created hope in the electoral processes and among the law enforcement agencies as well as widened the democratic space for the participation of all, through legal protections as well as decentralizing governance. Some 37, 1 per cent of respondents were unable to predict whether the next general elections could be violent or peaceful. The inability by many Kenyans to predict the nature of general elections could be due to the fluid nature of Kenya's political environment.

Despite the divergent views on the nature of the next general elections, evidence from recent by-elections held in Matuga, Juja, Starehe, Makadara and Ikolomani constituencies illustrate that electoral and law enforcement agencies can work together to manage conflict during election periods. These institutions will therefore need to be supported to realise their mandate.

## Access to justice

Access to justice considered what structures can be accessed to resolve disputes, what outcomes can be expected, and to what extent these expectations are met. Although evidence from the national conflict survey illustrated that legal/justice related issues were not seen by respondents as central causes of conflict (fewer than 9 per cent of respondents felt that 'justice-related' issues were a cause of conflict), the failure to address conflicts through formal and informal legal avenues was considered central to the failure of the whole conflict management process. The centrality is mirrored by the data in that 78 per cent of respondents believed that lack of justice was a trigger for conflict in their area, with the same percentage stating that a lack of dispute resolution mechanisms in their area was also a conflict trigger .

The survey illustrated that respondents perceived that beyond the courts, a number of different structures were effective in conflict management<sup>2</sup>. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) across the country suggested that understanding and reforming these avenues for conflict resolution and redress were central to an effective and comprehensive conflict management process. Comparing the data gathered from the questionnaire against that gathered from the key informant interviews and FGDs suggests that whilst respondents felt that certain structures were effective, this should be qualified against the fact that they fail on many occasions to achieve their objectives. That conflicts continue to occur in significant frequency across the country is testament to this status.

### **Environmental degradation**

Availability and access to high-quality environmental resources have been compromised by environmental degradation due to unsustainable environmental usage and effects of climate change. This survey showed that degradation had reduced soil arability, compromised quality and quantity of water supply and caused air pollution. This scarcity has been the cause of several conflicts over environmental resources characterised by access to scarce water, land, beaches and pasture, and privatisation of public land.

Another source of conflict has been the incompatible uses of environmental resources in the absence of sufficient civic education on alternative sustainable livelihoods. Such conflicts include those between environmental conservationists and communities whose livelihood depends on the environment such as sand harvesters, fishermen, charcoal dealers and illegal forest dwellers; and conflict between wildlife conservations and communities over compensation for wildlife damage to crops and property.

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<sup>2</sup> 49.6 per cent found national courts either effective or very effective, traditional structures – 65.7 per cent, peace forums 75.3%, DPCs 73.3%, KNCHR 57.1%, NCIC 41.7%, TJRC 38.8%; CSOs 69.4%, provincial administration 73.7%.



## 4.2 SCENARIO TWO: Worst-case scenario

The worst case scenario for Kenya could be as a result of the following factors:

### **Ethnicity**

If the political leaders persist in pursuing ethnically defined alliances, the country risks widening politically determined ethnic schisms. And as revealed in this study's political analysis, some political fallout among some ethnic groups inform grievances that feed new conflicts. The ballot is more than a political contest. As a matter of fact, 40 per cent of respondents felt that negative ethnicity remains a great contributor to conflict.

A national level political schism is bound to be reflected at lower levels such as counties and constituencies. As groups compete to have one of their own clinching counties, senate and parliamentary positions, the points of political conflicts will increase and potentially exceed the security forces' capacity to simultaneously manage. In this case, the IDP problem will persist.

The relatively new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) would struggle to handle an election of such magnitude, with seats contested for at county, senate, parliamentary and presidential levels.

The ICC process, its politicisation and continued lack of political goodwill to locally combat impunity would form harmful ingredients for wider conflict. This would be propelled by the political leaders' exploitation of ethnicity to blur the objectivity of the ICC process.

### **Economic situation**

The implementation of the National Land Policy, and especially the demarcation of community land, is likely to be a contested and highly politicized process and possibly in itself a trigger for violent conflict.

At a policy level, poor land administration and inadequate land utilization policy coupled with political

interference (for example, in resettlement of IDPs) continue to incite conflict. Attempts to address land related issues in the constitution remain contentious owing to the controversial nature of the interpretation of some of the sections dealing with land matters. The land issue is causing increased political tension as its contents undermine too many vested interests in the status quo. Land tenure, therefore, remains a challenge.

## **Elections**

The worst-case scenario is that electoral reforms as envisaged in the new constitution are not adequately implemented or supported. This would mean that the country goes into the 2012 general election without the required legal safeguards, which would open up the process to abuse triggering widespread violence as was witnessed in the 2007 general election. Due to the new decentralised dispensation, this violence would occur at national and county levels. Situations of conflict would arise ranging from boundary disputes to uneven distribution of resources within the counties and clan-based animosities. Further, the prevalence of small arms and light weapons in Kenya and particularly in pastoral areas means that devolved conflict take on an extremely violent and widespread dimension, with increased violence, including cattle rusting and other forms of gun violence. Failure by security agencies to complete and implement reforms would leave Kenyans unprotected during the chaos that follows the disputed election. Further, violent crackdown on post-election protest would result in extra-judicial killings and a pervasive atmosphere of fear and disorder. The sociocultural issues that precipitated the post-election violence (PEV) in 2007-2008 and violence in the previous electoral years of 1992 and 1997 have not been adequately resolved or addressed.

## **Access to justice**

The current status quo is not very far removed from the worst case scenario in terms of access to justice. Physically, courts would remain largely inaccessible. Traditional structures would degrade with the authority of elders completely eroded and with continued marginalization of customary structures from the formal legal regime. The judicial system, increasingly lacking expediency, efficiency and affordability would be completely ineffective for and/or beyond the reach of the average Kenyan. In the absence of avenues for judicial or non-judicial recourse, there would be severe 'mafiasation' of justice by organized gangs and vigilante groups.

Lack of political will by peace actors to adhere to regional and international instruments would leave Kenya unaccountable to its state counterparts for breaches of its international obligations.

### **Environmental degradation**

Unsustainable usage of environmental resources would increase degradation of these resources leading to food insecurity. Lack of arable land or water resources to sustain farming would result in the inability of the country to meet the food requirements of the population. Unregulated deforestation and destruction of water catchment areas would lead to a more severe impact of climate change in prolonged drought, unreliable rains and increased earth temperature resulting in loss of land cover, depleted water resources and death of wildlife. County conflict would result from over usage.

### **4.3 SCENARIO THREE: Best-case scenario**

Kenya's best-case scenario would be a result of the factors analysed herein:

#### **Ethnicity**

The new constitutional dispensation, coupled with the work of the NCIC and TJRC, will yield ethnic tolerance. The resolution of historical injustices through the TJRC, and the increasing national cohesiveness resulting from NCIC efforts to curb hate speech and ethnic discrimination, as well as the increasing national outlook of political parties thanks to the Political Parties Act, will provide firm grounds for a mature and patriotic electorate.

Strong issue-based politics assured in vibrant and disciplined political parties and leaders would promote nationalist politics that build the Kenyan nation. In similar light, the multiplier effects of peace processes such as the Uwiano Initiative, and the efforts of the district peace committees (DPCs) and civil society actors, would lead to peaceful communities keen on stability.

The IEBC would have learnt and internalised lessons from the successful referendum, and transparent post-

2008 by-elections that made it possible to utilise electronic voter registration, voter education and electronic transmission of by-election results. In this way, the 2012 and subsequent elections will be information and communication technology intensive and transparent, and results announcement will be quick, eliminating past anxieties about electoral outcomes which fed suspicion and violence.

## **Elections**

Under this scenario the 2012 elections proceed peacefully, further securing a democratic and inclusive dispensation in Kenya. The implementation of the constitution and legislation on elections means that structures are in place that can conduct elections in a free, fair and impartial manner. Mechanisms to satisfactorily address election petitions are in place securing the confidence of contestants and their supporters.

The security analysis indicates that the election in 2012 will generally be peaceful. One of the contributing factors to this could be the effectiveness of the security agencies in addressing security challenges. The study places effectiveness of security agencies at 62 per cent. The conduct and behaviour of security agencies in the lead up to the successful national referendum process in 2010 and other by-elections are cases in point. Throughout these processes there was no serious security incidences reported. Further, the relationship between the police and the community will greatly improve. The capacity of security agencies to handle electoral processes has been strengthened. This effectiveness coupled with improved community safety (53 per cent) will work towards delivering a peaceful election in 2012.

The impact of retrogressive cultural practices has dwindled through civic education, the strict application of legislation against hate speech, to secure equal representation in all sectors of life and the activities of the courts and specialised quasi-judicial agencies such as the NCIC.

## **Economic**

To lay the foundations for improved natural resource management, the National Land Policy has provisions which, if implemented, should help to manage conflicts arising from natural resource scarcity by changing,

among other things, tenure laws and benefit-sharing schemes to the advantage of local communities in Kenya, especially, in northern Kenya. It also contains measures that would safeguard the legal status of conservancies.

### **Access to justice**

Under this scenario, all Kenyan citizens can maximize their ability to access justice by being able to access the range of national, regional and international judicial structures as well a reformed and coordinated non-judicial legal regime. Traditional structures would be strengthened across the country, having taken into account the diminishing authority of elders and the patriarchal nature of many traditional structures that engender exclusion of other stakeholders. Partnerships would exist between judicial and non-judicial structures enhancing the enforceability of the decisions of traditional structures. Concepts of peace and justice as well as contradictions between principles of customary law and those contained in the constitution or under various regional and international human rights instruments would be resolved allowing for a system that is owned by various communities and that fosters inter-community cooperation in conflict management.

The National Peace Commission will be actively involved in exercising its mandate under the adopted National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy, which exercises oversight over conflict management in the country and oversees a hierarchy of operational and robust peace committees. Regional and international judicial bodies will form an extra avenue through which Kenyans can hold their government to account in fulfilling its international obligations especially those that address the structural causes of conflict in society such as human rights protections. Regionally, there will be increased cross-border cooperation from local to ministerial level towards enhancing joint peace structures and ensuring exchange of perpetrators.

### **Environmental conservation**

There will be rigorous implementation of the existing frameworks on environmental conservation, which will reverse levels of degradation and increase the availability of high-quality and quantity environmental resources eliminating the conflicts over diminishing resources. Engaging in sustainable environmental practices will

regenerate renewable resources such as forests and water catchment areas, resulting in a healthier environment with sufficient resources and reduced chances of conflict. Lastly, there will be improved access and shared usage of environmental resources due to availability of these resources in both quality and quantity.

## 5.0 CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

| Key thematic recommendation/<br>finding   | Implementation   | Main actors   | Intended impact   |
|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Security</b>   |  |   |   |
| <p>Advocacy on the enactment and implementation of peace and security related policies such as the peace policy, small arms policy, IDP policy etc. The need to have a comprehensive document that analyses security-related matters is vital to respond to the multifaceted needs of the Kenyan people.</p>  | <p>Government-community driven process</p>   | <p>Office of the President<br/>Internal Security and Provincial Administration</p> <p>NSC</p> <p>Foreign government aid agencies</p> <p>Provincial peace forums (PPFs)</p> <p>District peace committees (DPCs)</p> <p>Civil society organizations (CSOs)</p>    | <p>Holistic approach to security through the development of community friendly mechanisms that enhance community ownership</p>  |
| <p>Harmonise and sustain formal institutional arrangements for cooperation between civil society and government on issues of peace and security. The need to harmonise arrangements among key stakeholders gives synergies for cooperation and institutionalised frameworks that are acceptable across the board</p> <p>Fast-track security sector reform to strengthen responsiveness and accountability of security forces. It is fundamental that reforms are carried out consistently and with comprehensive public participation</p> | <p>Cooperation, transparency and coordination between security agencies and civil society</p> <p>Periodic audit of the police reform process. Advocacy for adherence and reviews</p> | <p>CSOs</p> <p>Security apparatus</p> <p>Provincial administration</p> <p>Police Reforms Implementation Committee</p> <p>Police Service Commission</p> <p>Police Oversight Committee</p> <p>OP Ministry for Provincial Administration and Internal Security</p> | <p>Development of harmonized and coordinated initiatives to address conflict by enhancing linkages between security agencies and civil society</p> <p>To ensure that ongoing police reforms conform to universal security provisions. Creates a secure and enabling environment for all Kenyans</p> |

| Key thematic recommendation/<br>finding  | Implementation  | Main actors  | Intended impact   |
|--|---|--|---|
| <b>Legal</b>   |   |  |   |
| Sensitise the formal judicial system to the particular challenges raised by conflict in Kenya vis-à-vis the judicial process. The disengagement between formal law and the society it ought to regulate must be addressed by enhancing the relationship between the judiciary and other non-legal peace actors       | Training judicial officers focused on the nature of conflict in Kenya. Conversely, training of non-judicial peace actors on the access to and outcomes of judicial processes  | Judiciary<br><br>Judicial Service Commission<br><br>Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association (KMJA)<br><br>Law Society of Kenya (LSK)<br><br>CSOs<br><br>Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (NSC) | A judiciary that provides a relevant and effective avenue for the mediation and resolution of conflicts across the country and improved linkages between judicial and non-judicial conflict actors  |
| Strengthen and engage with traditional structures with particular attention on their strengths, weaknesses and contradictions with the formal legal regime. Strengthen the currently institutionalised community frameworks by anchoring them in the law and hence, increasing the enforceability of their decisions | Debating, rationalizing and reconciling principles of customary law antithetical to principles of contained in the constitution and other legislation. Creating linkages and harmonization between the various customary mechanisms to foster intercommunity cooperation in conflict management | Traditional structures<br><br>CSOs<br><br>Livelihoods Resource Centre (LRC)<br><br>Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)<br><br>NCIC<br><br>LSK<br><br>Judiciary                             | Increased effectiveness of local/community/customary structures through recognizing their central role in conflict mediation and resolution. Legally entrenched and mandated local structures that enhance access to justice and dialectically complement the judicial system |
| Creation of a framework for the operation of CSOs engaged in conflict management to enhance monitoring, coordination and accountability at national and local levels. Some common ground needs to be created in the country to manage and coordinate the operations of CSOs  | Creation of a national strategy and policy focused on the operations of CSOs in conflict management   | CSOs<br><br>NSC<br><br>National NGO Council<br><br>Judiciary   | Activities of CSOs complementing and working in tandem with other judicial and non-judicial actors. Enhanced effectiveness and sustainability, as well as promoted use of peace agreements, declarations across the country   |



| Key thematic recommendation/<br>finding  | Implementation  | Main actors   | Intended impact  |
|--|---|---|--|
| Access to regional structures should be enhanced not only to hold the state accountable under its international obligations, but also in recognition of the fact that conflict is a regional phenomenon in many parts of Kenya and facilitating regional structures will enhance effective conflict resolution both within and across the border | Create regional forums to bring together non-legal conflict management structures from both jurisdictions to discuss collaboration. Enhance access to regional judicial structures by lobbying the government as well as informing the public on the access options for redress | Judiciary<br>Provincial administration<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br>East African Community Court of Justice (EACJ)<br>African Union judicial structures<br>CSOs<br>NSC | Accessible regional judicial and non-judicial structures that play a central role in addressing cross-border conflicts. A coordinated interstate response to shared conflict concerns. An additional avenue for redress particularly in regard to state failure to honor its international obligations |
| <b>Sociocultural</b>   |   |   |  |
| Strengthen the role of the NCIC by enhancing partnerships with community-based actors to sustain the core shared national values of integration and cohesion. This study emphasises the optimal utilisation of this diversity as both our strength and the foundation for coexistence  | Coordinating with and enhancing the capacity of the NCIC, highlighting the contribution of ethnicity to conflict  | NCIC<br>NSC<br>CSOs   | To enhance the capacity of the NCIC to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful coexistence between persons of the different ethnic and racial communities and thereby to address a structural cause of conflict in Kenya                                  |
| Encourage public dialogue fora, social exchange programmes and peace education as higher levels of social interactions in any society enhances the efficacy of grassroots conflict mediation and resolution  | Locally situated workshops, dialogues, Programmes and other community conversations on peace and conflict   | Traditional structures<br>CSOs<br>DPCs  | To prevent conflicts by enhancing local capacities to mediate and resolve conflict. The effectiveness of day-to-day disputes prevents escalation of these disputes into wider conflicts  |
| Promote awareness on constitutional provisions for representation of youth and women at all decision-making levels, including conflict management structures   | Wider stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes, fostering community ownership collective responsibility   | CSOs<br>LSK<br>Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA)   | As women and youth are key conflict actors, increased youth and women involvement in decision making regarding conflict management interventions, enhances conflict resolution by incorporating  |

| Key thematic recommendation/<br>finding  | Implementation   | Main actors   | Intended impact  |
|--|--|---|--|
|  |  | <p>Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YDEF)</p> <p>Ministry responsible for culture, social services and youth affairs</p> <p>NCIC</p> <p>Judiciary DPCs</p> <p>PPF</p> | a wider spectrum of perspectives   |
| <b>Political</b>   |  |   |  |
| Strengthen the performance and independence of the Registrar of Political Parties to implement the relevant laws to the letter. Political parties and the politicians heading them over time have mishandled the trust the people of Kenya had in them. The political parties have acted differently from what they promised to do in their manifestos. hence there is a need to institutionalise the order of operations by the political parties | <p>Legislative process to align the Act to the new constitution</p> <p>Policy dialogue forums on strengthening democracy</p>                                 | <p>The legislature</p> <p>Political parties</p> <p>Registrar of Political Parties</p> <p>IEBC</p> <p>NCIC</p>   | Having a strong registrar of political parties will empower the office and enable it rein in rogue parties. Stronger parties espousing nationalist ideals will be building blocks for nation building and truly nationally representative politics |
| Fast-track the establishment of an IEBC, which will independently and professionally discharge its mandate. The ECK bungled elections, and it wasn't truly independent, hence it contributed to a political crisis. The electoral malpractices and open anomalies destroyed the processes and eroded the people's faith and trust. To restore the confidence of people in this institution a people-driven process is vital                        | <p>Lobbying for a truly independent IEBC</p> <p>Transparent legislative process</p> <p>Civic education on the new body and its roles and those of voters</p> | <p>Legislature</p> <p>Civil society</p> <p>Media</p>  | An independent and modern IEBC will guarantee the sanctity of the ballot through transparent, free and fair electoral processes  |
| Design a collaborative mechanism for guaranteeing citizenship rights to all Kenyans to secure voting rights. In  | <p>Legislative process</p> <p>Awareness raising on Bill</p>  | <p>Legislature</p> <p>Civil society</p>   | The fundamental human rights enshrined as freedom of expression and association as well as   |

| Key thematic recommendation/<br>finding   | Implementation  | Main actors   | Intended impact   |
|---|---|---|---|
| this light, educate the public on the Bill of Rights in the new constitution  | of Rights and citizenship rights  | Media   | citizenship rights will be realised nationally  |
| <b>Environmental</b>  |   |   |   |
| There is a strong need to highlight the contribution of environmental factors to conflict as these important and significant challenges have yet to receive sustained consideration in conflict management circles. There is an urgent need to ensure and improve effective implementation of environmental conservation policies and initiatives, placing particular emphasis on the relationship with conflict. This supported by Chapter 5 of the constitution | Prosecution of environmental crime<br><br>Civic education and workshops involving the range of conflict actors to sensitize conflict management policy and practice | Judiciary<br><br>National Environment Management Authority (NEMA)<br><br>NSC<br><br>Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)<br><br>National Environmental Tribunal and Council<br><br>DPCs<br><br>PPF<br><br>CSO | Increased public awareness on the Environmental Management and Coordination Act and subsequent regulations, and the active litigation of cases of environmental crime accordingly. Growing recognition of environmental factors that contribute to conflict and cross-sectoral engagement on environmental issues |
| <b>Economics</b>  |   |   |   |
| Respondents felt that wide economic factors, especially poverty and unemployment, significantly trigger and cause conflict. The creation and implementation of sound fiscal policy, with particular focus on marginalised groups and areas, will address this finding. Further, holding the government to account under the constitution regarding measures taken to address the socioeconomic conditions of Kenyans is a strong tool for positive action         | Comprehensive implementation of the Vision 2030 and medium-term plan (2008-2012). Litigation before the courts interrogating the government's performance           | Vision 2030 Secretariat<br><br>National Economic and Social Council (NESC)<br><br>Judiciary<br><br>CSOs   | That the structural causes of conflict that engender conflict such as poverty and unemployment are actively mitigated and addressed   |

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